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Abstract
This paper shows that a more accurate depiction of the development of China’s private 
sector is gained by considering the complex interaction between bottom-up and top-
down processes. First, the paper analyzes the general characteristics of Chinese capital-
ism to help understand and classify the gradual institutional change in the enterprise 
sector. Second, it draws on insights from comparative political economy and new ap-
proaches in political science to introduce the strategy of “wearing a red hat,” an empirical 
phenomenon that provides a framework for the emergence from the 1980s of China’s 
private sector. This section also examines the closely interwoven relationships between 
private companies and the party-state that have taken place since the 1990s. Third, the 
paper indicates that focusing on state/capital relationships at different administrational 
levels contributes to a better understanding of China’s private sector. It concludes that 
the development and success of the new private enterprises, which remained closely 
linked to the state, enabled the ruling elite to form and consolidate a hegemonic project 
that provided relative societal coherence on the often bumpy road to reform.
Zusammenfassung
Dieser Artikel zeigt auf, dass ein Blick auf die komplexen Interaktionen zwischen „Bot-
tom-up“- und „Top-down“-Prozessen ein präziseres Bild der Entwicklung des Privat-
sektors in China liefert. Dabei hilft erstens eine Analyse von grundlegenden Merkmalen 
des chinesischen Kapitalismus, um den graduellen institutionellen Wandel im Unter-
nehmenssektor verstehen beziehungsweise einordnen zu können. Unter Bezugnahme 
auf die Vergleichende Politische Ökonomie und neuere politikwissenschaftliche Ansätze 
werden, zweitens, die empirischen Phänomene des „wearing a red hat“ in der Entste-
hungsphase des Privatsektors ab den 1980ern sowie der seitdem eng verknüpften Be-
ziehungen zwischen Privatunternehmen und dem Parteistaat eingeführt. Drittens wird 
erörtert, dass ein Fokus auf die engen Beziehungen zwischen Staat und Kapital auf ver-
schiedenen administrativen Ebenen zu einem besseren Verständnis des chinesischen 
Privatsektors beiträgt. Wie abschließend festgehalten wird, ermöglichte die Entwicklung 
und der Erfolg der neuen privaten, jedoch weiterhin eng mit dem Staat verbundenen 
Unternehmen es der Machtelite, ein hegemoniales Projekt zu formieren und aufrechtzu-
erhalten, das dem holprigen Reformweg eine relative gesellschaftliche Stabilität verlieh.
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Institutional Change in Market-Liberal State Capitalism: An Integrative 
Perspective on the Development of the Private Business Sector in China
1 Introduction
Since the 1980s, an impressive and – by comparison to other countries and regions – 
flourishing private sector has emerged in China. In a protracted incremental process of 
informal coping strategies by businessmen, the corporate sector underwent a gradual, 
yet transformative reorganization. It seems as if now a legitimized private sector pre-
vails where once different forms of state enterprises dominated.
Overall, statistics show a clear increase in companies that are formally run as private 
businesses: in 1978, SOEs (state-owned and state-controlled enterprises) accounted for 
77.6 percent of industrial output. The figures for 2006 suggest a share of industry output 
by SOEs of 31.2 percent, while the share of private companies has risen to 37.2 percent. 
The share of foreign-funded private enterprises, including investment from Hong Kong, 
Macau and Taiwan, amounts to 31.6 percent. At present, the private economy, under-
stood in a very broad sense as comprising “collective,”1 individual and other private en-
terprises, thus accounts for 65 percent of GDP (cf. NBS 2009; Chen/Wang 2010: 45–50).2
How did this transformation take place? What shaped the evolution of the new pri-
vate business sector? Will this process lead to a liberal market economy? To answer 
these questions, I adopt an integrative perspective that focuses on wider institutional 
environments and social contexts. An accurate analysis of the corporate sector cannot 
confine itself to the conventional unit of analysis, the firm. As firms both instigate and 
absorb institutional change, theoretical approaches need to be widened to reflect the 
importance of business relations in the form of coordination and ties with political 
structures. While there is now widespread acknowledgment that the institutional envi-
ronment conditions the economic field, many endeavors to identify these institutions 
neglect the “non-market” relations that may be important as explanatory variables. 
I would like to thank Luo Siqi, Helen Callaghan, Britta Rehder and Guido Moellering for their helpful 
comments. Furthermore, this paper benefited from comments made at the “Working Group on In-
stitutional Change,” held at the MIT Political Science Department in Cambridge, February 4–5, 2011.
1 Collectively owned enterprises (COEs) at the subnational level often represent enterprises owned 
by cities, urban districts and communities that have been wholly or partially privatized in recent 
years. As will be seen in the following, formal legal differentiation between company forms in 
mainland China is difficult. This is due among other things to the peculiar structure of Chinese 
capitalism, blurred dividing lines between public and private property, and the corresponding 
spread of inaccurate expressions such as “non-state” or “popularly managed” companies.
2 As a matter of fact, different calculations lead to different results. Compare for instance Huang 
(2008: 13–19), whose figures show that the sum of indigenous and foreign private firms only 
amounted to 50.8 % of industrial output in 2005.
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While it is important to highlight the importance of the practices of entrepreneurs in 
the creation of new businesses, I believe that such practices go well beyond “managerial-
ist” assumptions in neoclassical economics as well as “voluntaristic” theories in sociol-
ogy and political science (cf. Powell/DiMaggio 1991).
Three perspectives inform my analysis of the development of China’s private business 
sector: First, I assume that an appreciation of general characteristics of the contempo-
rary Chinese system – perceived as a distinctive form of market-liberal state capitalism – 
helps us to understand and classify the specificity of gradual institutional change in the 
enterprise sector. Consequently, the paper rejects the notion that “postsocialist” societ-
ies inevitably move towards a liberal market economy. Second, I draw on insights from 
Comparative Political Economy and new approaches in political science for the analysis 
of gradual institutional change, introducing the empirical phenomena of “wearing a 
red hat” – a saying that refers to the practice of informal privatization that shaped the 
emerging private sector from the 1980s onwards – and the closely interwoven relation-
ships between private companies and the party-state since then. Third, although the 
paper focuses on the bottom-up processes of entrepreneurial experimentation, it shows 
that the state/capital relationships at different administrational levels contribute to a 
more precise picture of the design of China’s private sector.3 Thus, this paper shows 
that private sector flourishing was not just induced by flexible informal institutions 
from below – by managerial agency creatively dealing with constraints as told in liberal 
marketization success stories (Huang 2008) – and nor was it just a top-down process led 
by the party-state (Yang 2004).
I begin by discussing the essential spheres of China’s new capitalism and introduce sev-
eral tools for understanding gradual institutional change within the private business 
sector. In the empirical sections, I document the strategy of “wearing a red hat” and 
the phenomenon of thickly embedded capitalists. To gain a wider view, I then outline 
several dimensions of enterprise-embedding within China. I then analyze the corpo-
rate sector against the background of multi-level governance, state entrepreneurialism, 
private-public networks, and the capacity of the central state to steer and reform, and 
I provide additional information on opportunity structures for gradual changes in the 
trade regime. I conclude that the development and success of the new private enter-
prises, which remained closely linked to the state, enabled the Chinese ruling elite to 
form and consolidate a hegemonic project that provided relative societal coherence on 
the often bumpy road to reform.
3 By challenging theories of market transition, which argue that the “transition from redistributive 
to market coordination shifts sources of power and privilege to favor direct producers relative 
to redistributors” (Nee 1989: 663), this paper does not overlook the numerous possibilities for 
“redistributive power” to capture market opportunities. This is because the ruling elite controlled 
resources that were indispensable in the evolution of new markets (cf. Szelényi/Kostello 1996).
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2 Competition-driven state capitalism
To avoid reducing significant institutional change to either the achievements of indi-
viduals or the shrewdness of entrepreneurs, one has to give due weight to the broader 
changes in Chinese society that have led to a form of “Chinese capitalism.” To examine 
the specific features of the corporate sector requires the historical variability of capital-
ist systems to be taken into account. The need to differentiate between various types of 
capitalism is rooted in the acknowledgement that there is a spatiotemporal unevenness 
between the major subsystems of the world economy. The “internationally variegated 
capitalist world system” (Streeck 2010: 38) is made up of a network of capitalisms, along 
national and regional lines, that differ but are at the same time linked and which un-
dergo permanent processes of differentiation and adaptation.
I refer here to the findings of Comparative and International Political Economy (cf. 
Amable 2003; Coates 2000; Jessop/Sum 2006; Streeck 2009, 2010). A critical review of 
current theories of capitalism (ten Brink 2008: 50–97; ten Brink 2010) enables an ana-
lytical framework4 to be formulated that distinguishes between five structural charac-
teristics of capitalist systems in general, whose mixture-ratios then produce different 
historical variants of capitalism:
 – The horizontal axis of capitalist competition, i.e. the systemic requirement for ex-
tended accumulation and innovation for the sake of profit maximization through 
competition between companies. This generates an unsynchronized, crisis-prone 
dynamism.
 – The vertical axis of capitalist social relations, i.e. the class polarization between those 
with and those without wealth, the social structural conflict it feeds and the motiva-
tions for individual social advancement it creates. This axis, which allows distinct la-
bor systems and intermediary institutions to develop that may or may not be labor-
inclusive, opens up different paths to an entrepreneurial “freedom” to act.
 – The establishment of monetary zones and specific financial systems which lead to 
the differentiation of distinctive varieties of capitalism and company strategies.
 – The interaction between economic and political actors that form a network cha-
racterized by structural interdependencies. Government actions play a constitutive 
role in shaping economic processes. In reality the crisscross of areas of government 
responsibility and its underlying institutional characteristics is the basis for distinct 
political systems – such as liberal states or, in the case of China, the “party-state.” In 
order to be able to distinguish between political systems, varying degrees and forms 
4 In contrast to transhistorical reasoning, this framework focuses “not on institutions as such, and 
not even on economic institutions, but on the economic institutions of capitalism” (Streeck 2009: 
231) – i.e. on capitalist imperatives which shape the business sector in myriad ways.
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of state intervention and business promotion must be taken into account. State in-
tervention and state ownership need not exclude capitalist ownership but can be 
among the many forms of particularistic control and the exercising of economic and 
political power, e.g. in the form of state capital.
 – The international and transnational embeddedness of capitalist systems, i.e. their 
specific integration in global economic, (geo-)political and other intersocietal rela-
tions.
The specific combination of these five features to be found in the People’s Republic 
of China makes for a distinctive form of capitalism. A market-liberal entrepreneurial 
spirit coexists with widespread state interventionism, which in turn is guided by macro-
economic success parameters manifested in a heterogeneous bundle of private-public 
economic regimes.5 The peculiarities of Chinese market-liberal state capitalism, estab-
lished during the reform era, include:
First, special forms of competition and private-public corporate organization. The ac-
cumulation drive in China is being achieved in an environment where economic rights 
of disposition and control shift from state authorities to the management of numer-
ous companies (Nee 2005). This process reconfigures the structurally interdependent 
relations between economic actors and those with political power. These relationships 
are generally governed by a “mixed economy” system of formal and informal relations 
that is neither “free” nor “competitive” in the classic sense. Although a renewed form of 
state enterprise is dominant at the level of central government, private-public economic 
regimes have gained particular significance at the subnational level. As shown in the fol-
lowing, the predominant practice of informal privatization (“wearing a red hat”) began 
to include formal privatization from the 1990s – without overriding the symbiotic ties 
between party, state and industry.
Second, the emergence in urban labor relations of a fragmented type of labor-exclusive 
corporatism in terms of intermediary institutions. The remodeling of labor relations is 
generally based on fragmented regulation that is evident from an inadequate implemen-
tation of legal norms and a lack of effective institutions to create a balance between labor 
5 The Chinese system can only be equated to a simple hybrid of “capitalist” and “socialist” prin-
ciples under very narrow definitions of these terms – “socialism” as understood by the current 
Chinese leadership as pursuing economic growth by any means deemed necessary, and “capital-
ism” as a mere synonym for markets. A better understanding is to therefore consider China’s 
economic polity as a form of state-led capitalist developmentalism (for a more detailed account, 
cf. ten Brink 2010). Contrary to “Sinomania”-reasoning by Western commentators, the contra-
dictions of the Chinese “miracle” must also be considered. Immense internal polarization and 
its opposing dynamics, the coexistence of highly developed and large expanses of backward, ag-
ricultural regions, and the related problems of over-investment and under-consumption, make 
for a highly divided regime of accumulation.
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and (state) capital.6 The various types of production regimes, a massive segmentation 
and flexibilization of employment, low base wages, long working hours that are often in 
violation of existing legal standards and also huge wage differentials between employees, 
and the lack of trade union mobilization capacity opened an expanse of opportunities 
for (but were also the result of) private entrepreneurial “experiments” that had elements 
that were innovative as well as destructive.
Third, the strategic role of government in regulating financial and monetary relations 
that prevents simple adaptation of a liberal model (Naughton 2007: 449–481). State 
banks act as the main financing sources of economic growth, which means that although 
a number of firms on the fringe strongly rely on informal sources, larger companies de-
pend on these quasi-state entities. In addition to the four largest commercial banks and 
several central state-controlled “policy banks,” other commercial, mainly listed banks 
have started to make their presence felt. Most of them flourish on the basis of local 
power structures. From 2005 on, classic private banks were admitted for the first time. 
Up to the present day, financing by bank loans is more common than by the capital mar-
ket. Nevertheless, the capital markets have burgeoned into the second largest in Asia.7
Fourth, a political system constituted by a notable combination of central and decen-
tralized power. This competition-driven form of multi-level governance, which will be 
dealt with in more detail in section 5, is a key factor in capturing the dynamics of com-
pany reorganization because it brought about relative social stability and thus made 
possible many of the significant transformations in the first place.
Fifth, Chinese integration into global economic, East Asian and other transnational re-
lations and power structures that has led to a fragile but, up to now, mainly dynamic 
balance of power between mainland Chinese, overseas Chinese and foreign econom-
ic engagement. The People’s Republic developed its economy in a phase of advanced 
transnationalization that coincided with changing global economic and geopolitical 
structures and contributed to a significant opening up of the economy. The relative suc-
cess of company reorganization in China is thus partly due to favorable external oppor-
tunity structures – China became the world’s most attractive production location at the 
precise moment when real accumulation in the old centers was slowing down after the 
1970s and a new international division of labor was emerging (cf. Brenner 2006; Breslin 
6 When, in the face of group interests from entrepreneurs (and, for example, by the activation of the 
All China Federation of Industry and Commerce, cf. Holbig/Reichenbach 2005), the state occasion-
ally assumes the role of a balancing element. This corresponds to a fundamental state “responsibil-
ity” in capitalist societies – and should not be misinterpreted as a relic of “socialism.”
7 The reforms of the financial system highlight another area of institutional layering and conver-
sion which cannot be considered here. But there are also signs of institutional blockade and 
disorder: For instance, when the new “policy banks” were grafted onto the existing system in the 
1990s – with the aim of taking on the tasks performed by the four existing specialized banks – 
the “Big Four” continued to operate in their old realms and retained responsibility for financing 
government projects.
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2007; Hung 2009). The geopolitical landscape had also changed, i.e. improved relations 
with the US, that worked in China’s favor. Furthermore, the almost global expansion 
of market relations from the 1970s onwards, accompanied by the belief in dynamic 
markets, the role of individual entrepreneurialism, new administrative structures and 
liberal concepts of Corporate Governance greatly encouraged mainland China to create 
a private sector.8
China has undergone an unprecedented transformation from a planned economy to a 
strongly market-oriented system while exhibiting a degree of continuity in its political 
and social institutions. The vestiges of a bureaucratic planned economy, a ruling com-
munist party, and late industrial development will be part of the Chinese model for the 
foreseeable future.9 Research on China has for some time now focused on this aspect 
of restructuring that is both path dependent and path shaping (cf. McMillan/Naughton 
1996; McNally 2007; Naughton 2007; Nee/Opper 2007). In China, institutional change 
did not lead to the radical replacement of one institutional arrangement with another, 
but to new combinations and layering that brought about significant processes of insti-
tutional conversion. Thus, the development of the People’s Republic of China did not 
lead to the adaptation of a liberal model of capitalism but gave birth to a new form of 
competition-driven state capitalism. In what follows, one has to bear this constellation 
in mind because it has become (and is still becoming) a remarkable example of private 
sector evolution.
8 In the 1980s and 1990s, a huge number of China’s international investment projects served the 
aim of informally transferring property from state to private ownership (Ding 2000). This then 
represents another strategy for transforming the economy that cannot be taken into consider-
ation here. These informal privatizations involved several forms of changing the de facto own-
ership of public assets, e.g. illegally shifting abroad money gained in China or siphoning funds 
from state-owned firms. It was conducted almost exclusively by cadres and managers (and their 
kin) in positions of advantage because they had the key resources for this form of marketization, 
i.e. permission to work abroad and investment capital.
9 The adaptable institutions in China point to links to the historical developments before 1978, 
with the reform process taking a socio-structural “side-step“ from one form of bureaucratic 
class society to another. Although in Mao’s era the CCP’s language was more anti-capitalist, 
the bureaucracy was nevertheless privileged and exercised its exclusive right to distribute social 
surplus through its monopoly of the state. The fact that the power elites currently prefer the 
coexistence of private and state control over the means of production does not indicate a revo-
lutionary new order in China but rather a change in the way it is ruled as part of a gradual pro-
cess of institutional change. The objective of achieving economic growth by any means deemed 
necessary remains the same – only the instruments to accomplish it have changed.
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3 Theorizing institutional change
How can we explain the significant changes in the Chinese economy and especially the 
ascent of a huge private sector? In the following sections, I attempt to show how experi-
mentation from below, i.e. “wearing a red hat” (dai hongmaozi), whereby private compa-
nies mask their private-ownership by registering as publicly-owned companies, interact 
both with growth-oriented policies, at times crisis-induced, and political steering from 
above (e.g. the role of the state, the transformation of COEs and SOEs, new regulatory 
institutions), and produce a distinct business sector. Due to space constraints this paper 
examines only the emerging private sector’s bottom-up processes in detail.
To answer the question of how to understand the gradual transition within the eco-
nomic system, Western political science tools for analyzing institutions are used which 
may aid research into China. These tools portray institutional development in an evo-
lutionary manner, but emphasize its potentially discontinuous effects. As shown when 
applied to China, they may yield some interesting results (e.g. about the evolution of 
new markets) even for the non-China specialist.10
From an historical institutionalist perspective, institutions are described as “social re-
gimes” or as ruling groups (“Herrschaftsverbände”) in the Weberian sense in order 
to capture their provisional, adaptable and hence contestable nature (Streeck/Thelen 
2005). Institutional change derives from interactions among various actors. Thus, in-
stitutions are persistently contested and are often infused with ambiguities that can be 
exploited as sources and levers for change.
To avoid a formalistic analysis of institutions in capitalist systems, we must look at the 
distribution of power in society – both in the past, which led to the formation of in-
stitutions, and in the present, which is altering the appearance of institutions. This is 
necessary to see “behind” the formal structure of institutions and grasp the coalitions 
of actors that shape them. “The foundation [of a dynamic analysis] is one that conceives 
institutions above all else as distributional instruments laden with power implications” 
(Mahoney/Thelen 2010: 7–8). The creation of new institutions requires “institutional 
work” (Lawrence/Suddaby 2006) by a wide range of actors. In the case of China this 
includes both those with the capacities and skills to act as businessmen and those with 
a supportive role to the entrepreneur’s endeavors.
Streeck/Thelen (2005) conceptualize several ideal-typical mechanisms that capture the 
gradual transition of institutions in developed political economies that, over time, can 
cumulate into major institutional transformation. In the case of China, two mecha-
nisms are particularly relevant: institutional layering and institutional conversion. In-
stitutional layering describes processes leading to the often initially informal formation 
10 See for instance Fligstein (2001: 14) who complains that the evolution of new markets has been 
insufficiently considered in the social sciences.
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of institutions in parallel and in interaction with existing institutions. These processes 
ultimately bring about changes that have a transforming effect on the existing institu-
tions. To a certain extent, groups of actors with insufficient power are able to modify 
institutions in an oblique way. “Layering involves active sponsorship of amendments, 
additions, or revisions to an existing set of institutions” (Streeck/Thelen 2005: 24). An 
institutional conversion represents the use of existing institutions for new or alternative 
purposes. These processes can be set in motion by a shift in the environment that con-
fronts actors with problems: “Different from layering and drift, here institutions are not 
so much amended or allowed to decay as they are redirected to new goals, functions, 
or purposes” (Streeck/Thelen 2005: 26). Even when the prescribed attributes of institu-
tions remain in place, their substantive roles may change dramatically.11
As Tsai explains, those ideal types of institutional transition that to date have served 
mainly to analyze liberal democracies and OECD economies, can be applied to China: 
“The case of China demonstrates that even in nondemocratic settings where formal 
institutions appear to be imposed in top-down fashion rather than subject to popular 
suffrage, everyday actors may quietly appropriate formal institutions to serve their own 
ends” (Tsai 2006: 123; cf. Tsai 2007: 210). She then describes circumstances under which 
institutional change can in all probability be anticipated:
This is most likely to occur when there is a gap between the original intentions of formal institu-
tions and the perceived needs and interests of local actors. At the same time, local state agents 
may collaborate with ordinary people by intentionally misinterpreting the formal institutions 
that they are supposed to uphold. Such bureaucratic deviance is more likely to be found in 
situations (1) where different formal institutions have conflicting mandates (a situation that 
facilitates ignoring one set of rules in order to comply with another); (2) where policy imple-
mentation is relatively decentralized; and (3) where local officials have convergent interests with 
local citizens in a particular policy area (for example, promoting local economic growth, hiding 
revenues from higher levels of government, protecting local industry, bending rules to attract 
external investment, and so on). In turn, these collaborative interactions may generate adaptive 
informal institutions that provide a powerful demonstration effect and prompt policy elites to 
transform key attributes of the official political and economic orders. (Tsai 2006: 123)
The following will show that China had an opportunity structure conducive to these 
circumstances.
11 Other modes of gradual but nevertheless potentially transformative change such as “displace-
ment”, “drift” and “exhaustion” cannot be considered here (cf. Streeck/Thelen 2005: 18–30).
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4 The strategy of “wearing a red hat” and the phenomenon of thickly 
embedded capitalists
Research on China based on both the “red hat strategy” and the rise of private entrepre-
neurs with close ties to the state and other “red capitalists,” illustrates how evolutionary 
change transformed the Chinese corporate sector. Specifically, it describes how innova-
tive informal practices triggered the layering of formal institutions that eventually result-
ed in institutional conversions. Reform can be seen to have taken place over two phases.
The first phase of reform
Some historical background is valuable at this point. Facing the ruin of the Cultural 
Revolution, the elite increasingly accepted as valid whatever policies increased national 
output. The reform process was initiated for the survival of the party-state, not out of 
ideological principle. It resulted in a combative process of “trial and error” which led 
to hugely successful experimentation with markets and entrepreneurialism.12 Ordinary 
people benefited from market penetration in the 1980s, especially under local market 
conditions. Whilst the resilience of the party-state prevented more radical transforma-
tion, this tentative constellation of “crossing the river by groping for stones” – bor-
rowing from a metaphor commonly attributed to Deng Xiaoping – enabled adaptive 
informal institutions to play a vital role in the process of change. Two phases of gradual 
transformation can roughly be identified: the period from 1979 to 1989/1991 and the 
period from 1992 onward. In the first phase, agriculture was the predominant sector 
where the evolution of new markets began to take shape.13 The industrialized urban 
sectors followed a little later (Shirk 1989).
A reduction in the planned system was not immediately accompanied by a widening 
of decision-making powers for business managers. In this context, the red hat strategy 
represented an effective evasive-maneuver. In the first phase of reform, it was the most 
popular practice whereby companies that were undeniably private, were able to mask 
their private ownership by formally registering as COEs, basically state-owned enter-
prises under the control of local governments.
12 Nevertheless, the first phase of reform can in no way be seen as straightforward. Years of reform 
were at times jeopardized by both the pace of change, which differed from region to region, and 
by U-turns. The “Tiananmen intermezzo” led to a conservative rollback between 1989 and 1991 
that was eventually brought to an end by the party’s reform wing only in early 1992. The success 
of further restructuring measures guaranteed that reforms from then on were seen as the norm.
13 Several continuities with older traditions could be observed that resonated with former innova-
tive approaches taken in wartime base areas, in the early 1950s, and in the short resurgence of 
household and market activities in the early 1960s.
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For a more precise analysis, Tsai distinguishes between formal and informal institu-
tions.14 Adaptive informal institutions are more likely to evolve in environments in 
which both the executors in formal institutions and the creators of informal adapta-
tions have converging interests. Formal institutions are transformed in a process in 
which both state and non-state actors benefit from the existence of adaptive informal 
institutions that, in the process of transition from informality to formality, may gain 
intermediate levels of formality. Tsai backs up her argument with the example of how 
privately run companies were established in the guise of collective enterprises. Prior to 
1988, it was forbidden to operate private enterprises with more than 8 employees. Reg-
istration as a COE or as a SOE was a way of founding larger private companies.
As shown, a process of institutionalization through informal practice can be detected in 
the evolution of the private sector. In the first phase of reform, and even up to the mid-
1990s, the lack of official recognition led many businessmen to enter into an arrange-
ment with the local authority whereby the company would become publicly owned 
and then subcontracted to them. “Estimates on privately owned collective enterprises 
range from one third nationally to as high as 90 percent in some localities” (Tsai 2005: 
1136). Various terms were used to portray this substitute for a private firm: “pseudo-
collectives”, “pseudo-SOEs” or “disguised private enterprises” to name a few (cf. Chen 
2007: 58). The strategy of “wearing a red hat” brought advantages including favorable 
tax treatment and preferential access to bank credit. Local officials provided the firms 
with money, markets, land, and labor. It was not only rural TVEs (“Township and Vil-
lage Enterprises”) that formed the backbone of the emerging private sector; the red hat 
strategy was also moving into urban areas.15 A 1988 survey conducted in Wenzhou, 
which probably had the most highly developed private economy of the time, identified 
“45,000 privately owned firms of various forms under the banner of collective enter-
prises, but only 10 registered private enterprises” (Chen 2007: 57).
All in all, this practice of layering demonstrates an informal adaptive institutionaliza-
tion that gradually altered the formalized institutional framework of company manage-
ment. Over the course of time, the popularity and success of this practice led to support 
14 She defines adaptive informal institutions as regularized patterns of interaction that emerge as 
responses to the restrictions and opportunities of formal institutions. She also refers back to a 
special case of path dependency – “reactive sequences”. This identifies feedback mechanisms 
within institutions that generate the unfolding of paradoxical, unintentional consequences that 
in turn lead to the spread of a sometimes different, even opposite turn of development. The 
constant factor in this process of non-linear institutional development is a nature of change 
below that of systemic change: “That is, short of authoritarian breakdown, it is plausible that 
significant changes could nevertheless occur within the apparent limits of the existing political 
system” (Tsai 2006: 120).
15 In a nutshell, TVEs could develop rapidly once they received support from subnational govern-
ments in getting access to credit. They lost this privileged position in the first credit crises of the 
early 1990s and with it a key competitive advantage. This resulted in strong pressure for further 
reorganization.
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both at the local political level, as being important for local economic development, and 
also among leaders within the power elite pushing for reform.16
As a consequence, several official political reforms in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
showed signs of an institutional conversion to replace the informal rules that had hith-
erto prevailed. For example, the discourse on private sector development in Wenzhou 
prepared the ground for new national regulations that improved the legal standing of 
private firms. “In 1988, the State Council issued the Private Enterprise Law and a sub-
sequent constitutional amendment acknowledged the private sector as a supplement to 
the socialist public sector” (Chen 2007: 60). After the party’s reform wing finally halted 
the rollback between 1989 and 1991, the process of layering again began to quicken.
The second phase of reform
From the early to mid-1990s, a large number of red hat employers – enabled by the 
CCP’s endorsement of China as a “socialist market economy”17 and the enactment of a 
new Company law – began to register officially as private businesses (Chen/Wang 2010: 
47).18 Thereafter, the official private sector grew by an average of 35 percent per year. In 
lieu of the red hat strategy, the ascent of thickly embedded private capitalists and “red 
capitalists,” in the main private entrepreneurs who were CCP members, became critical 
factors in the second phase of transition:
Concerning thickly embedded private capitalists, the explosive growth of the private 
sector in some ways enabled a rags to riches rise of individual businessmen. At the same 
time, The Hurun Rich List – a Chinese equivalent of Forbes – which in 2010 ranked 1363 
individuals with personal wealth of at least one billion Chinese yuan (US$ 150 million), 
16 Several factors contributed to subnational political entities partially renouncing their control 
over wealth by transferring economic power to private actors. These factors included: the will-
ingness of many local leaders to experiment with new methods of political development because 
of the decades of want and instability; the changes in central government tax legislation of the 
1980s offering greater financial scope to compensate for possible losses resulting from local eco-
nomic reforms; the consequences of transferring responsibility to managers and the increased 
efficiency this brought to company management to exert pressure for further modernization. 
Although legal proceedings against red hat practices were possible, these did not dominate the 
reform process. The success of the red hat strategy marginalized anti-market forces within the 
party-state. In reality no strict dividing line existed between legitimate business practices and 
illegal activities or corruption punishable by law.
17 The second phase of reform was heralded by the official acceptance of the “socialist market 
economy” during the 14th congress of the CCP in 1992.
18 Another example is the possibility of registering as “limited liability companies,” typically former-
ly COEs, of between 2 and 50 shareholders with a limited shareholder status (NBS 2007). They 
gained in importance, which was possible among other things by a clause in the Corporations Act 
of 1994 that permitted the reforming of “public” companies as “limited liability companies.”
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reveals that “12 percent of those listed had been appointed to significant government 
advisory posts, handing them a powerful platform in a business climate that values of-
ficial contacts” (www.hurun.net/listreleaseen512.aspx). This has also been the trend for 
the lower and medium echelons of the private sector. Many entrepreneurs – e.g. many 
of the businessmen in Zhejiang Province who work predominantly in the most com-
petitive or the most marketized sectors – either belong to or have close ties to political 
bodies (e.g. the local People’s Congresses and People’s Consultative Conferences), or 
take part in village elections.
At the beginning of the most rapid phase of the private sector’s expansion, the trans-
formation processes amounted to new private-public alliances between economic and 
political power elites that also manifested as actual personal unions. Empirical studies 
point out that closely interwoven politico-business interaction is typical not only for 
CCP membership19:
According to Ms. A [Owner of AB Furniture Company], the rapid growth of AB Furniture in 
the late 1980s endeared her to top government officials in the township where AB was located. 
Therefore, starting with strong political contacts at the local level, Ms. A became a representative 
in D city’s PCC and a member of one of D city’s district-level People’s Congresses in 1993. In 
1996 Ms. A moved up a further step and became a representative in the D City People’s Con-
gress. Finally, in 1998 Ms. A was invited to serve on the D City Quality Inspection Association. 
[…] Despite Ms. A’s refusal to acknowledge direct links between AB Furniture’s development 
and her political activities, […] her political standing has yielded a standing in China’s political 
system for AB Furniture. AB thus enjoys greater respect from government officials and the bu-
reaucracy works faster, better, and with less trouble. […] Specifically, AB Furniture has benefit-
ed in the following rather direct ways from Ms. A’s political guanxi networks. First, the granting 
of official awards, such as the ‘famous brand name’ award on the provincial level, has generated 
free advertising and public relations for AB Furniture. […] Second, Ms. A’s political status has 
made it easier for AB to access credit, especially in the early 1990s as it was very difficult for pri-
vately run enterprises […] to take out big loans. Third, Ms. A’s political stature facilitated access 
to crucial market information. […] Finally, Ms. A’s position on the D City Quality Inspection 
Association gives her indirect influence over the implementation of government policies in the 
furniture sector. (McNally/Guo/Hu 2007: 9–10)
Concerning “red capitalists,” one third of the Hurun Rich List is estimated to be made 
up of CCP members. The privatization of mainly small and medium-sized SOEs was 
another key contributor to private sector growth after the mid-1990s – between 1998 
and 2006, the number of SOEs shrunk from 238,000 to 119,000 (Chen/Wang 2010: 44). 
This privatization was especially important in introducing a legalized process for priva-
tizing state-owned firms (gaizhi) whereby managers could acquire their firms at a price 
based on recent profitability.20 These cases of “management buy-outs” (MBO)21 point 
19 Hence it makes more sense to speak of state capitalism in a broader sense than, say, “cadre” 
capitalism.
20 The Chinese stock market also encouraged the privatization of large companies by opening up 
new avenues of capital procurement for SOEs from new shareholders.
21 As the following remark about a former SOE indicates, MBOs became increasingly common – 
“to the point that the headline in the city’s newspaper in January 2003 proclaiming the [firm’s] 
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to the fact that in many instances CCP cadres took on the role of “red capitalists.”22 Even 
prior to the legalization of private property and “even though CCP members were not 
allowed to operate private businesses, it was apparent throughout the 1980s and 1990s 
that many were active participants in the non-state sector. Indeed, official surveys reveal 
an increasing proportion of self-identified CCP members among private entrepreneurs 
over time, such that only 7 percent of business owners admitted to being party mem-
bers in 1991, but by 2003 over one-third admitted to being party members” (Tsai 2006: 
132–133; cf. Tsai 2007: 72–104). Furthermore, as Dickson documents, the “larger the 
‘sales revenue’ of a firm, the more likely its owner is a Party member”, and the more 
likely that Party organizations exist in their firms (Dickson 2007: 839–840). It is often 
those capitalists who operate the largest firms who “are the most likely to be involved in 
the political arena. Indeed, most of them […] are more likely to support the […] exist-
ing authoritarian political system rather than pose a direct challenge to it. This is a key 
element of the CCP’s strategy for survival, and so far it is working” (Dickson 2007: 852). 
“Co-opted” entrepreneurs state in surveys that the main reasons for joining the party 
are the economic advantages and connections to the political sphere (Dickson 2007: 
841–842; Dickson 2003: 162–164).23
The shift from individual control to formal individual ownership, and the legal changes 
this involved, proceeded over several years. The Party leadership reacted by changing 
its attitude to private enterprise. This is evident from legalization on party member-
ship for entrepreneurs (2001), the constitutional amendment on assurances for private 
property (2004) and finally the announcement on property rights (2007) that gave the 
same protection to both private and public property. Although private entrepreneurs in 
practice remained more or less absent from this process, the political power elite gave 
the All China Federation of Industry and Commerce credit “for representing the voice of 
private entrepreneurs and pushing for the private property clause to create a stronger 
political case for revising the constitution along the lines that they had been hoping for” 
(Tsai 2006: 139).
All in all, the remarkable ascent of China’s private sector led to a gradual, yet transfor-
mative change of policies. Where informal coping strategies once reigned, an acknowl-
edged private sector now prevails. However, this process should not lead to prematurely 
imminent privatization simply used those three English letters ‘MBO’ instead of the equivalent 
Chinese characters, as if most newspaper readers would instantly recognize the English-lan-
guage acronym for a management buy-out” (Chan/Unger 2009: 22).
22 This also applies to “red families” with high-ranking political backgrounds that help gain access 
to social resources. “Red families” are prevalent in the infrastructure, energy and real estate sec-
tor.
23 In the party apparatus itself there are two motives for wanting to co-opt entrepreneurs: on the 
one hand, the political class has an interest in cooperating with those social groups responsible 
for economic growth. This is particularly so for local party officials at regional authority level, 
whose career paths are directly linked to high growth rates; on the other ‘preventive’ hand, is the 
attempt to hinder the formation of organized opposition by exerting control in this form.
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concluding that there has been a simple transition to a liberal market economy. Private 
property remains embedded in the (often local) political scene. The forms of recom-
binant property in China are characterized by an extraordinary influence from state 
actors and state entrepreneurialism, even when this property takes on new forms. This 
is shown in the next section.
5 The embedding of the enterprise in China
The corporate sector has to be analyzed against the broader background of market-
liberal state capitalism with its multi-level governance, intra-regional competition, state 
entrepreneurialism and private-public networks on the one hand, and the politics of the 
central state on the other. This leads to the conclusion that the transformation process 
amounted to a hegemonic project of the “private-public” Chinese power elite. To avoid 
the trap of state-centered theories, with the Chinese Leviathan as a clever, forward-look-
ing force shaping the economy (Yang 2004), one has to bear in mind the favorable exter-
nal/regional/global opportunity structures that existed. This paper does not fully con-
sider these but they did equip the ruling class with the means to cope with the hazardous 
path of allowing the private sector grow, and to muddle through the reform process of 
the 1980s and 1990s into what one may call an almost hegemonic rule of the 2000s.24
Intra-regional competition, state entrepreneurialism and private-public networks
The bottom-up processes that stimulated the creation of a huge private sector were 
placing major pressure on different levels of the state. But due to the state’s entrepre-
neurial spirit and the sub-national competition between different state bodies, political 
administrations were able to act in a relatively compatible way.
In a sense, the structural interdependency between economic and political actors in 
capitalist systems in general assumes a particularly close correlation in China. Never-
theless, it has not assumed a monolithic form. It is impossible to understand the econ-
omy without reference to the diverse fragmentation below the level of the central state. 
The state in China could possibly best be defined as a “diffuse” capitalist developmental 
24 In the 1980s, East Asian countries – and, in a sense, their business sectors – became role models 
for China (see section 6). Additionally, the overseas Chinese fuelled the country with FDI and 
entrepreneurial spirit. In the 1990s, China became the most attractive location for production 
and entrepreneurial activities in the world when an over-accumulation of capital, classified as a 
capital investment crisis, hit the traditional production centers in the West. The reform process 
was, in contrast to the Soviet nomenklatura, mastered not only due to exceptional strategic skills 
or self-confidence but also due to many fortunate coincidences (cf. ten Brink 2010: 33–40).
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state (McNally/Chu 2006: 54).25 This also includes subnational governments which al-
low local enterprises to violate national labor laws. Since the subnational political levels 
have assumed the role of a local developmental state, they attempt to build settings 
conducive to success by creating incentives to stimulate economic efficiency in their 
territories by means of support, supervision of and direct involvement in companies. 
Good examples of this are the major investments in infrastructure, the development of 
“supply-chain-cities” and specialized single-product clusters in the coastal area (Gereffi 
2009). Internal competition between subnational bodies vying with each other to at-
tract investors has driven the rise of economic development. Government officials or 
state managers are thus often substitutes for entrepreneurship. This creative, though 
frequently corrupt commercial activity is in a way reminiscent of the Schumpeterian 
entrepreneur, but in a novel “state-capitalist” sense.26
Hence, the “state” and the “market” cannot be regarded as being mutually exclusive. 
Conventionalized, counter-juxtaposed concepts of private and state actors do not really 
clarify the situation in China. The opposite is the case in that, for example, legal forms 
– private versus state property – do not determine the scope of budget constraints on 
actors in the economy in the customarily assumed dichotomy of soft budget constraints 
for state companies versus hard budget constraints for private enterprises. As Walder 
wrote some time ago, the “analysis of soft budget constraints usually proceeds as if there 
is only one owner in the economy, ‘the state‘, although in fact there are potentially as 
many owners of public enterprises as there are government jurisdictions” (Walder 1995: 
268). Because they are subject to competitive pressures, the capacities involved in accu-
mulation activities by local political institutions or local government officials in China 
have a lot in common with private capitalist companies or managers.
Although the frequently mentioned guanxi networks – closely personalized and affec-
tive forms of interaction and empathy – lend the Chinese economy a high degree of 
particularized coordination, it occurs within the confines of a competitive society.27 
25 The decentralization of regulatory power does not end at the provincial level. State power exists 
at different levels of the “local” and different types of regimes have been adopted by different 
localities. There is diversity between a form of diffuse developmental state and a corporatist 
state where the political authorities delegate influence to social groups who do not need to be 
formally recognized.
26 Interestingly, for Schumpeter, the entrepreneur is not necessarily a self-employed businessman, 
but anybody who takes on the entrepreneurial “function” of promoting “new combinations” 
(Deutschmann 2009: 5). As can also be seen in instances of innovation processes in Western 
countries, entrepreneurialism should be conceived as a more collective process in contrast to 
the Schumpeterian mainstream. Even when employers see the role of local governments to be of 
very limited and tangential importance to success, businesses are in truth shaped by numerous 
supportive institutions (Herrmann 2010).
27 The historical development of markets in general has been closely connected to processes of 
particularized coordination that in turn provided essential requirements for the functioning of 
competition (cf. Moellering 2010). China is thus no exception to the rule, although coordina-
tion has assumed a specific form.
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As part of the growing monetization of social relations, these private-public alliances 
do not, as assumed by neo-classical theory, constitute a gradual transition to a “pure” 
market. Instead they are themselves to be regarded as a form of marketization. The 
commercial rationality is virtually synonymous with an ongoing development and cul-
tivation of personal relations with local district bodies who have the resources that can 
promote business. From a political economy perspective, guanxi networks are seen as 
compensation for the historical absence of a regulative basis for market interaction. 
One function of this social interaction is its role as a politicized network – as microstruc-
tures of market-liberal state capitalism in which state and private actors (ultimately 
defined by the state) are bound together on several levels. What Western scholars would 
potentially call “productive incoherence”, in effect delineates some of the peculiarities of 
China and maybe its competitive advantage.28
Wank adds to this assessment the assumption that in the course of the reform process 
a change in the power configuration emerged between industry and government, with 
corporate strategies exerting more influence on the behavior of local political bodies. 
Greater dependency on the activity of entrepreneurs is manifest in a new kind of compe-
tition setup: “Previously, citizens competed to enter officials’ patronage networks. […], 
now officials also compete with each other for links to larger private companies, with suc-
cessful ones becoming shareholders and managers” (Wank 1999: 198). The organization 
of cooperation between the actors in society is reflected by changing coalitions for devel-
opment. The result is not the automatic appearance of autonomous areas in civil society 
but rather semi-autonomous network communities of political and private actors whose 
economic development concepts are relatively independent of central government bod-
ies.29 Newly founded institutions at the local level (e.g. chambers of commerce or other 
non-governmental entrepreneurial civic associations) exemplify this trend.
This system of multi-level governance is subject to continuous bargaining and contract-
ing within the administration, and between the administration and the business sector. 
At the same time, local institutional competition appears to be of utmost importance as 
a coordination mechanism (Krug/Hendrischke 2008: 94–95). Similar to the federal po-
litical structures and interregional competition that formed the backbone of industrial 
growth in the USA in the 19th century, the “de facto federalism” (Zheng 2007) in China 
stimulates the dynamics of its economy.
28 Nevertheless, complementarity of institutions in the sense of a functional fit did not exist ex 
ante, but was discovered and developed ex post.
29 In contrast to liberal-democratic forms of capitalism, what has evolved in China is a specific 
network-form of dealing with contradictions within the pluralistic power apparatus. “Such plu-
ralization does not occur through the formal trappings of electoral democracy, such as competi-
tive parties and popular voting, but rather through the shifting power distribution and bargain-
ing relations within networks” (Wank 1999: 202).
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The central state and its capacity to steer and reform from above
In a way, political institutions in China create the framework within which both the 
market oriented state capitalist and the private entrepreneur can operate. With re-
gards to the central state, the government did not just adopt capitalist growth poli-
cies, individual entrepreneurialism and active support in privatizing SOEs. There was 
and still is another central-state role that is not to be underestimated: the provision of 
an overarching institutional architecture that accommodates competition. One politi-
cal strategy regularly used by the regime to gradually initiate reform was to introduce 
change in only a few test areas, e.g. in Wenzhou or in Guangdong province, followed 
by a wider introduction of the policy when the test proved successful. Despite the fact 
that experimentation procedures have been delegated to local authorities, the central 
administration in Beijing plays an indispensable role in universalizing local innova-
tions thereby generating coordination into the Chinese policy cycle (Chen/Wang 2010: 
77–79). This capacity at macro level can be interpreted as experimentation under hier-
archy: “The ‘federalism, Chinese style’ approach suggests that hierarchical governance 
has been replaced by administrative decentralization, jurisdictional competition, and 
central-local bargaining. Although these factors play an important role in central-local 
interactions, and local governments clearly feel more confident and secure today in 
making local policies, none of these changes has eliminated the weight of hierarchy and 
ad hoc central interference in China’s political economy” (Heilmann 2008: 11; cf. Zheng 
2010). In other words, experimentation “from below” required patronage that might 
be the go-ahead from higher level policymakers through either non-intervention or 
encouragement and public backing.
Thus, the background of a competition-driven form of multi-level-governance in China 
and the anarchic processes concerning the (internationally embedded and dependent) 
economy should not lead to any premature conclusion that the central state is growing 
weaker (cf. Goldman/MacFarquhar 1999). In fact it is precisely its partial erosion in the 
first phase of reform that lent the central government and the rule of the Party new le-
gitimacy from the 1990s onwards. One important example of this is the extractive power 
of the central state: in the second phase of reform, and particularly since the tax reforms 
of 1994, the central state has been able to recentralize resources to a considerable degree. 
In terms of its own modernisation, several waves of bureaucratic restructuring led to 
strong (supra)ministerial institutions such as the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM, see 
section 6) or the National Development and Reform Commission, which is now a hub in 
industrial development organization (Saich 2004: 121–136). Additionally, many of the 
large centrally-controlled state enterprises, which were restructured and are now mostly 
listed, were brought together from 2003 onwards under the State Asset Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC). The founding of SASAC marked a milestone in 
the restructuring of state-owned business groups that act as a form of reliable consum-
er for numerous “red” suppliers and other private subcontractors (Ma/Lu2005; SASAC 
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2006).30 In the state-controlled telecommunications sector, for instance, numerous pri-
vately owned “chip-design companies” produced a range of equipment for the Chinese 
3G standard.
6 A note on favorable external opportunity structures for gradual changes 
in the trade regime
The development of agencies that subsequently created the MOFCOM in 2003 exempli-
fies the external sources of change in political institutions that need to be included with 
endogenous factors such as experimentation, new power constellations and ideological 
agendas (Chin 2007). In the first phase of reform, several existing governmental agen-
cies were merged into the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT), 
which from 1982 onwards embodied an amalgam of different and conflicting tradi-
tions within the CCP. But the turn towards “exportism” guaranteed an intra-bureau-
cratic compromise that initiated a process of institutional conversion. As older guiding 
principles of Maoism eroded, a new agenda for development appeared. The success of 
several East Asian economies helped in finding new ways of achieving growth. Japan, 
towering above its neighbors, was not alone in its success: “By the late 70s, South Korea 
had industrialized at a break-neck pace under Park Chung Hee and, most galling of 
all, the GMD regime in Taiwan was not far behind. The pressure of this setting on the 
PRC was inescapable” (Anderson 2010: 78–79). An understanding emerged that greater 
wealth could translate into internal legitimacy and regional power. Within MOFERT it 
took shape as a shift away from a policy of strict controls to one of preferential treat-
ment for international economic activities. Henceforth MOFERT (later MOFTEC and 
finally, MOFCOM) became a form of intra-governmental avant-garde that propelled 
forward the exportist regime that was accompanied by a faith in dynamic markets, the 
positive role of individual entrepreneurialism, and new concepts of corporate gover-
nance. Mainland Chinese businessmen gained greatly from this constellation – be it as 
suppliers to big foreign corporations or from technical spill-over. The “Shanghai Inter-
national Automobile City”, the biggest industrial cluster in China of components and 
parts suppliers, and mostly run by private Chinese businesses, emerged following the 
establishment of VW and GM; indigenous firms typically act as suppliers.
30 The role of the state as an economic stabilizer for the private sector applies also to previous 
phases of reform: “[Since the 1980s] competition eroded initially high profit margins for state 
firms and induced the government, as owner of the firms, to become more concerned with prof-
itability. The government experimented with better incentive and monitoring devices, and this 
experimentation improved state-sector performance. Nonetheless, the state sector grew more 
slowly than the nonstate firms that were entering new markets. […]. Yet [overall] growth oc-
curred with economic continuity that was attributable to the maintenance of a small planned 
sector as a kind of stabilizer, as well as to robust saving and investment that powered continued 
economic growth” (Naughton 2007: 97).
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7 Conclusion: Institutional transformation and hegemony
The purpose of this paper was to integrate theoretical and empirical insights to show 
that the complex interaction of bottom-up and top-down processes provides a more 
precise picture of the development of the private sector in China. Chinese capitalism 
has thus maintained its distinctive private-public characteristics even when the pros-
perous private sector appears at first sight to be a liberal market economy.
With regard to the evolution of the Chinese society as a whole, gradual institutional 
change through the mechanism of layering and conversion has served not just the new 
private or semi-private entrepreneurs. Reform policy has also served the interests of the 
state bureaucracy and the Party – the CCP with its 70 million members acts as a form 
of catch-all party for capitalist modernization, and controls social transition while still 
functioning as a channel for the power elite (Brodsgaard/Zheng 2004; Shambaugh 2009). 
While the success of enterprise restructuring in China cannot be explained without in-
cluding the favorable external opportunity structures, there remains the fact that until 
now, internally, the interdependencies between party, state(s) and entrepreneurs pro-
vided a strong alliance that created space for experimentation as long as growth rates 
remained high. This constellation produced new channels for upward social mobility 
through success at the market place. The prospect of individual upward social advance-
ment – also promoted through the development of a consumer society – was a central 
source of motivation for entrepreneurs and for those wanting to become businessmen, 
and this contributed to relative social stability. This has been accompanied by a huge faith 
in progress that is reminiscent of the heydays of modernity. In other words, this disposi-
tion simultaneously provided both the required leeway for sometimes very difficult and 
socially disruptive adjustments and the motivation to risk entrepreneurial endeavors.
Thus, “communist” party-rule, a strong state31 and “Chinese-styled market-liberalism” 
have not undermined one another. Far from it: the state class perceives industrial growth 
and technological upgrading as a means of buttressing CCP legitimacy and China’s na-
tional greatness (Gilley 2008). This corresponds, for instance, to the pragmatic policy of 
the “three represents”, i.e. the CCP claiming to represent not only workers and farmers, 
but also the interests of entrepreneurs, the so-called new advanced productive forces. 
While in 2004, 35 percent of entrepreneurs in China were party members, less than 6 
percent of the total population belonged to the CCP. Therefore, rather than seeking 
autonomy, many private capitalists have pursued a combination of institutional and 
affective ties that “thickly embed” them with the party-state (McNally/Wright 2010). 
The increasing socio-economic mobility of entrepreneurs has to an extent been facili-
31 The state’s prominent role is also due to several “non-economic” spheres in which the state and 
its agencies dominate social life, i.e. in politics, in creating numerous civic and social organiza-
tions, and in attempting to establish environmental protection systems. At the same time, a pro-
cess of societal pluralization and increased autonomy in everyday life could be observed in recent 
years, in which the CCP increasingly retains its viability in a consultative but authoritarian way.
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tated by their ties with the regime so they have had little reason to criticize it. On the 
contrary, the common interests of the state bureaucracy, the state, and private capital-
ists frequently lead to common viewpoints. “In contrast to the popular perception that 
privatization is leading inexorably to democratization, […] the most recent survey data 
suggest that [private businessmen] are increasingly integrated into the current political 
system. […] This again suggests that the growing shared interests of government and 
business are creating an environment that supports the status quo, rather than one in 
which businessmen are motivated to press for change” (Dickson 2007: 852).32
In terms of critical political economy, the Chinese ruling elite was capable in the sec-
ond phase of reform of forming and consolidating a historical bloc – including the ur-
ban middle classes and intellectuals – and transformed its dominance into hegemony. 
The emergence of a new economic regime and a new “economic imaginary”, which is 
articulated in state and private-public projects, underpinned a relative societal coher-
ence. Gradual institutional change through layering and conversion would not other-
wise have proceeded to the same extent. The objective of a “harmonious society”, as 
expressed by the current leadership, could then be interpreted as an attempt to renew 
social compromises that are crucial to maintaining hegemony and upholding the path 
of reform. Because markets, however, tend to have a destabilizing impact on their insti-
tutional framework and resist institutionally imposed stabilization and control, a har-
monious society may prove difficult to achieve in the years to come.
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